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  The 2003 mutual fund scandal was the largest in the 65-year history of mutual 
funds in the U.S. This scandal continues to attract empirical investigations about 
mutual fund investors’ behavior and their reaction to the scandal. Motivated by the 
anecdotal evidence that mutual funds with different managerial characteristics 
experience different fund flows after the disclosure of the 2003 scandal, I investigate 
whether the 12-b1 fees, ownership structures of fund management companies, funds’ 
distribution channels and their SEC charge records have some effects on mutual fund 
flows.   
 
 This study find that the ownership structure of the mutual funds plays a very 
important role in determining the extent of the fund outflow from the scandal-tainted 
funds. Specifically, funds attached to large financial conglomerates experience lower 
withdrawals. One reason for this could be that such institutions are better able to stave 
off bankruptcy in the event of a large scandal withdrawal. I do not find significant 
evidence that the channels of distributions to retail or institutional investors have 
differential outflows due to the mutual fund scandal. 
 
This study reveals the concerns of fund investors and adds to the understanding of 
investment patterns when investors are facing the largest fund scandal in the history. 
The fund industry can learn from this relationship and exploit these investor behavior 
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  The 2003 mutual fund scandal was the largest in the 65-year history of mutual 
funds in the U.S. In total over one thousand funds and $1 trillion in assets were 
investigated regarding allegations about late trading and market timing.  
 
Mutual funds implicated in this scandal experienced large amounts of outflows 
after the investigations were initiated. This paper examines whether the 12-b1 fees, 
ownership structure of fund management companies, funds’ distribution channels 
and their SEC charge records have some effects on fund flows after the sandal was 
exposed. This study finds that the differential treatment in market punishment can 
be explained by the ownership structures of the fund management companies. 
However, the distribution channels of fund shares seem to have little effect in 
mitigating outflows.  
 
This study reveals the diverse concerns of mutual fund investors, expands on 
previous research and adds to the understanding of investment patterns when 
investors faced the largest fund scandal in the history of the mutual fund industry. 
The fund industry can learn from this relationship and exploit these investor 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
  The mutual fund scandals attract more and more literature investigating the 
fund investors’ behavior and reaction to scandals. Houge and Wellman (2005) 
observe that the scandal-tainted funds’ parent firms lose more than $1.35 billion 
of market capitalization over the 3-day scandal-announcement period. They also 
find that equity funds that were investigated underperform equity funds that were 
not investigated by a statistically significant 0.15% per month or 1.8% per year 
from Jan. 2001 to Dec. 2003. Choi and Kahan (2006) improve the study of Houge 
and Wellman (2005) by providing empirical evidence that fund investors penalize 
scandal-tainted funds and make statistically and economically significant 
withdrawals. Moreover, withdrawals are greater for scandals that are more severe 
and for scandals that are more likely to generalize investor loss. Schwarz and 
Potter (2006) find that funds which were involved in the scandal and survived a 
post scandal period of 18 months experience significantly lower fund flows than 
those that could not survive the post scandal period. This finding is consistent with 
Choi and Kahan (2006). 
 
The existing literature has not investigated the differential fund flows among 
the scandal-tainted funds. However, some anecdotal evidence shows that such 
difference may exist. According to the estimates prepared by Financial Research 
Corp., Putnan Investment recorded a 9% fall in long-term mutual fund assets in 
Nov. 2003. Outflows from Janus in September, October and November were 3.1%, 
2.3% and 2.9%, respectively, of the long-term mutual fund assets at the start of 
each month. Strong Funds (a fund family) suffered an outflow of nearly $1.6 
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billion in November, or 6.5% of assets under management at the start of the month. 
About 2% of Alliance Capital’s fund assets, or $786 million, flowed out in 
November. The above figures show that different fund families incurred 
differently outflows of assets during the scandal period. 
 
  Motivated by the above anecdotal evidence about the different patterns of fund 
flows for the various scandal-tainted funds, this paper examines the 
cross-sectional differences in the fund flows among scandal-tainted funds. 
Specifically, I relate the different fund flows to factors associated with the 
management of mutual funds, including 12b-1 fees, the ownership structure of 
fund management companies, the distribution channels (retail vs. institutional 
channels1) of fund shares, and the SEC charge records. The findings show that the 
ownership structure of fund management companies plays an important role and 
results in significantly different fund flows for different scandal-tainted funds. 
While the distribution channels may also act as a determinant of the fund flows, 
the empirical results do not provide robust support for this finding. In this paper, 
the empirical findings indicate that the 12b-1 fees and SEC charge records are not 
likely to affect the fund flows after the scandal was exposed, but these results can 
also be attributed to the lack of precise measurement of proxies for these factors. 
 
  The behavior of mutual fund investors has important implications for the 
soundness of the mutual fund industry. Fund flows reveal the investment decisions 
of fund investors. The existing empirical studies explore the relations between 
fund flows and fund characteristics such as past fund performance, fund fees and 
                                                        
1 The mutual fund distribution channels refer to how funds are sold to the investing public. The retail channel, 
through brokers, fund supermarkets and retirement plans, primarily serve individual investors. The 
institutional channel is used by financial institutions, foundations and other institutional investors. 
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expenses, the role of brokers, search costs and advertising, and fund corporate 
governance.  
 
The relationship between fund flows and the above fund characteristics extends 
the understanding of the factors that investors consider when selecting from many 
funds. However, the existing literature devotes little attention to the above 
relationship when mutual funds experience a breach in the trust placed in them. 
The mutual fund scandals are rooted in the fiduciary conflicts of interest between 
investors and fund management. The patterns of fund investor behavior may be 
different during periods when the fund management puts its interest before that of 
investors, compared to periods when the interests of the fund management and 
investors are aligned. When mutual funds are involved in scandals, investors bear 
the direct cost of scandals and thus place a great emphasis on the safety of their 
investments. This behavior would depend on the relative importance of fund 
characteristics and thus determine fund flows. For example, Qian (2006) indicates 
that some managerial incentives, such as the fund size, the ownership of the fund 
management company, and the past scandal records, proxy for the fund’s 
reputation and play a role in predicting fund indictments. The previous theoretical 
studies (e.g., Kreps and Wilson (1982); Diamond (1991); Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (1994)) on firm reputation show that reputation of financial 
intermediaries serves to reduce the impact of information asymmetry in the equity 
markets. From this point of view, the managerial factors which proxy for the 
fund’s reputation may affect the investor reaction and fund flows when investors 
are facing the uncertainty of scandal-tainted funds. Moreover, existing literature 
indicates that other managerial factors, such as the fund distribution fees and 
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distribution channels also affect mutual fund flows.  
 
To date, there has been no research on the relation between the reputation effect 
of fund management companies and fund flows. This paper expands previous 
research by analyzing what managerial factors affect flows of scandal-tainted 
funds and lead to different consequences of investor withdrawals. Using a 
short-term event-study approach, this study shows that investors pay more 
attention to the ownership characteristics of fund management companies. 
Although investors universally withdraw from scandal-tainted mutual funds, the 
funds affiliated with large financial conglomerates2 experience lower outflows 
when compared to other funds. This pattern can be attributed to the reputation 
effect of large financial conglomerates and their capability of providing enough 
collateral against default for fund assets under management. Moreover, funds that 
draw in money through more institutional distribution channels experience more 
money outflows since institutional investors “vote with their feet” when they are 
dissatisfied with fund management.  
 
Using the coefficients estimated from the empirical models of this study, I 
calculate the magnitude of the effects of the above managerial factors on 
scandal-tainted funds’ outflows. The findings show that the different ownership 
structures of fund management companies may lead to a difference of 10% money 
outflows. Such difference can be translated into about 19.8 million dollars of TNA 
(Total Net Assets). This difference in the outflows between different funds is 
                                                        
2 This study uses the definition of financial conglomerates defined by the paper Supervision of Financial 
Conglomerates prepared by the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates. The Financial Conglomerate refer 
to “any group of companies under common control whose exclusive or predominant activities consist of 
providing significant services in at least two different financial sectors (banking, securities, insurance).” 
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economically significant. The different distribution channels also result in the 
difference of 12% of fund flows. From the viewpoint of scandal-tainted funds, if 
they are aware of the important roles of such managerial factors that can buffer the 
negative impact of fund scandals on funds’ assets under management, they may 
initiatively adjust their marketing, distribution or management strategies to exploit 
the effects of buffering factors. For example, the funds may put their marketing 
emphasis on the reputation of their management companies and their parent firms 
when funds suffer from fund scandals. They can also employ more distribution 
channels or adjust their 12b-1 fees. Such adjustment in fund management caters to 
the most important concern of fund investors and can be observed by investors via 
marketing. Finally, such adjustment may increase investors’ confidence in holding 
the shares of scandal-tainted funds and buffer the negative impact on TNA. 
 
My paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature. 
Chapter 3 describes the hypotheses. Chapter 4 constructs the sample and models 
for empirical analysis. Chapter 5 provides empirical results. Chapter 6 explores 
the robustness tests of which I examine in Chapter 5, and Chapter 7 concludes. 
 6
Chapter 2: Backgrounds 
 
2.1 Mutual Fund Litigations 
 
In Sep. 2003, New York Attorney General (NYAG) Elliot Spitzer announced a 
civil complaint against Canary Capital Partners (a hedge fund) that was involved 
in illegal “late trading” practices. Spitzer sparked a massive investigation into the 
mutual fund industry by NYAG, the SEC and other regulatory institutes.  
 
As of Dec. 2004, the SEC and several state attorneys general have formally 
indicted or investigated at least 25 mutual fund families involving into the market 
timing and/or late trading scandals. Settlements stemming from these charges 
amount to more than $3.1 billion in fines and restitution (Houge and Wellman, 
2005). This 2003 mutual fund scandal was the largest in the 65-year history of 
mutual funds. Totally over one thousand funds and $1 trillion in assets were 
investigated due to late trading and market timing allegations (Schwarz and Potter, 
2006). 
 
The practices of late trading and market timing are quite different. SEC Rule 
22c-1 requires investment companies to issue any redeemable security at a price 
based on the current net asset value (a “forward” pricing method). According to 
this rule, mutual funds must issue and redeem shares at the NAV (Net Asset 
Value3). This rule leads almost all mutual funds in the U.S. to measure daily 
NAVs at the market close time of 4:00 p.m. (Eastern Time). Late trading refers to 
                                                        
3 The value of fund assets less the value of the liabilities. 
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the purchase or sale of a fund share after 4:00 p.m., but at the 4:00 p.m. price. 
Market timing involves rapid trading in or out of fund shares to take advantage of 
potential stale prices of fund shares, since the price quotes of small-firm stocks, 
international funds and high-yield bonds are not updated based on the up-to-date 
information. This is common in the trading of international funds in which the 
pricing of their holdings is subject to the time zones of different markets. 
Although the market timing is not illegal, Spitzer contended that fund firms 
committed fraud when they allowed some clients to trade more frequently than 
their fund documents and prospectus allow them to trade. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
The existing literature has examined how fund flows are related to some fund 
characteristics such as past fund performance, fund fees and expenses, search 
costs and advertising, and fund corporate governance (Zheng, 2008). This stream 
of research not only sheds insight on the investment decision at the individual 
investor level but also provides important implications into the well-functioning of 
the fund industry.  
 
Past fund performance 
  Ippolito (1992), Gruber (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) show a nonliner relation between fund flows and past fund performance. 
They find that the performance-flow relationship is convex since investors 
disproportionately flock to high performing funds while failing to withdraw from 
lower performing funds at the same rate. But this nonlinear relation is not 
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consistent with the empirical findings examining the relationship between past and 
future fund performance. The findings of Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993), 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996), Brown and 
Goetzmann (1995), Carhart (1997), Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman (1998) 
suggest that the good performance may or may not persist in the future, but the 
poor performance will most likely persist.  
 
  Why investors stick with poor performing funds? Some research indicates the 
effects of transaction costs and investment strategies. Huang, Wei and Yan (2007) 
construct a theoretical model to show that in the medium performance range, 
funds with lower participation costs (including transaction costs and information 
costs)  have higher flow sensitivities than their higher-cost counterparts, while in 
the high performance range, this relationship may be reversed. Lynch and Musto 
(2003) show that the flows are less sensitive to poor performance when funds 
discard the previous poorly performing strategies. 
 
  According to Zheng (2008), there are two reasons why investors stick with poor 
performers. The first reason is that investors apply a representativeness heuristic 
(Tversky and Kahnemann, 1971). The second reason is that the lack of 
performance persistence for strong performers is a result of investor behavior to 
chase past performance (Berk and Green, 2004). This is due to the decreasing 
returns to scale for assets under management.  
 
Fund fees and expenses 
  In general, empirical evidence indicates a negative relation between fund flows 
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and total fund fees. But further research shows that investor behavior is different 
for different types of fund fees.  
 
  Sirri and Tufano (1998) show that the changes in expenses are inversely related 
to flows, but changes in loads do not increase or decrease flows. Increasing loads 
leads to increasing marketing efforts and thereby decreasing search costs, thus 
offsets the negative effect of increasing loads on the attraction of fund shares. 
 
  Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) find that investors are more sensitive to 
salient, in-your-face fees, like front-end loads and commissions, than to operating 
expenses. 
 
Search costs and marketing 
  Collecting and analyzing information about the profile of individual funds is 
costly for different investors, e.g., sophisticated vs. unsophisticated investors. Sirri 
and Tufano (1998) argue that investors would purchase funds that are easier or 
less costly for them to identify. Using fund complex size, fee levels and media 
coverage, they construct three measures of search costs. They show that high-fee 
funds, which presumably spend much more on marketing, enjoy a much stronger 
flow-performance relationship than do their rivals.  
 
  Khorana and Servaes (2004) show that fund families charging lower fees than 
their competition rivals gain market share, but only if these fees are above average 
to begin with. Low-cost families do not lose market share by charging higher fees. 
In addition, fees charged explicitly for marketing and distribution (12b-1 fees) 
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have a positive impact on market share. Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) also find 
that 12b-1 fees are positively related to fund flows. 
 
  Gallanher, Kaniel and Starks (2006) find a relation between a fund family’s 
flows and its relative levels of advertising expenditure with a significant positive 
effect for high relative advertiser only. 
 
  According to Del Guercio and Tkac (2008), the information packed into a 
Morningstar rating, which is prepared by a reputable and unbiased source, 
plausibly reduces search costs for investors. They provide empirical evidence that 
positive abnormal flows follow Morningstar rating upgrades, and negative 
abnormal flows follow rating downgrades. 
 
The role of brokers 
  Why do investors pay distributional fees to purchase brokered funds? For 
researchers, the benefits of brokerage services are vague due to the less tangible 
aspect of brokerage services. The existing empirical evidence identifies little 
benefit of such services. 
 
  Zhao (2004) find that load funds with higher loads and 12b-1 fees tend to 
receive higher inflows. This finding suggests that brokers and financial advisors 
apparently serve their own interests by guiding investors into funds with higher 
loads. But he also finds that when their interests are not compromised, brokers and 
financial advisors either exhibit similar behaviors as no-load fund investors or 
show their expertise by directing investors into smaller funds, which might 
 11
experience better performance. 
 
  Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2005) find evidence that brokers focus on 
younger and smaller funds that are not covered by major fund rating services. 
Brokers do not direct investors to less expensive funds. Brokered funds do not 
outperform direct-channel funds.  
 
  Christoffersen, Evans and Musto (2005) show empirical evidence that fund 
families benefit from a captive broker (the broker representing only one family) 
through recapture of redemptions. This finding demonstrates an influence of 
brokers on investor decisions. 
 
Mutual fund corporate governance 
  The issue whether fund investors care about fund governance has received little 
attention4. Some recent papers show the relationship between fund governance 
and flow sensitivity to fund past performance.  
 
  Qian (2006) indicates that fund flows act as an effective external monitoring 
mechanism. She provides empirical evidence that funds with higher flow 
sensitivity to past returns are less likely to be involved in trading violations. Good 
reputation is also an effective governance mechanism. For the internal governance 
mechanism, Qian (2006) shows that board structure and board compensation play 
an important role in monitoring funds. The unitary board structure5 is more 
effective in monitoring funds than the multi-board structure. Boards of indicted 
                                                        
4 The current research has focused on fund’s internal governance mechanism, that is, the board of directors 
(See Tufano and Sevick (1997); Dann, Del Guercio and Partch (2002); Verma (2003)). 
5 The same board looks over all the funds in the family. 
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firms are more highly compensated compared to those of non-indicted firms. 
 
  Wellman and Zhou (2005) use the data of Morningstar Stewardship Grades6 to 
show that investors sell funds with poor grades and buy funds with good grades.  
 
2003 fund scandal 
  There are two streams of research that are related to the 2003 mutual fund 
scandal. The first one focuses on documenting the evidence of market timing and 
late trading in the fund industry and offering explanations. Bhargava et al. (1998), 
and Boudoukh et al. (2002) provide detailed market timing strategies for 
international equity funds. Goetzmann, Ivkovic, and Rouwenhorst (2001) not only 
provide econometric methods to differentiate stale pricing7 profits from profits 
due to true index predictability, but also propose a “fair pricing” mechanism. 
Greene and Hodges (2002) find how mutual fund flows correlated with 
subsequent fund returns can have a dilution impact on the performance of 
open-end funds. Active trading of open-end funds has a meaningful economic 
impact on the returns of passive, non-trading shareholders, particularly in 
U.S.-based international funds. Zitzewitz (2006) estimate the extent of late trading 
before the 2003 mutual fund scandal was exposed. 
 
  The second stream of research devotes the attention to the market penalty and 
investor response to this scandal. Choi and Kahan (2006) find that investors 
penalize scandal funds and scandal fund families by making significant 
                                                        
6 They include five criteria: board quality, regulatory issue, fees, management incentives and corporate 
culture. 
7 The daily NAV pricing rule allows U.S. investors to trade the shares of international funds at prices 
determined earlier due to time-zone defferences. 
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withdrawals. Schwarz and Potter (2006) find that funds involved in scandals 
experience wealth declines of over 80 basis points per year. 
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Chapter 3: Hypotheses 
 
  Among the investors owning fund shares outside defined contribution 
retirement plans8, more than 80% own fund shares through professional financial 
advisors which include full-service brokers, independent financial planners, bank 
and savings institution representatives, insurance agents and accountants (ICI, 
2005)9. Many investors enjoy the services of fund distribution channels such as 
brokers or advisors, in exchange for front-end loads, back-end loads and 12b-1 
fees. Under Rule 12b-1 of Investment Company Act, mutual fund advisors can use 
fund assets to cover the costs occurred in fund distributing and marketing. 
According to Ye (2005), most 12b-1 fees (95%) are paid to selling brokers for 
their distributing and marketing services. Although brokers are required by NASD 
rules to provide suitable investment advice to their clients, they may provide some 
advices that would maximize their present and future fee revenues or other 
benefits to themselves. Some empirical work has shown the relationship between 
12b-1 fees and fund flows. For example, Zhao (2004) find that load funds with 
higher loads and 12b-1 fees tend to receive higher flows. Christofferson, Evans 
and Musto (2005) find that fund families benefit from captive brokerage through 
recapture of redemptions, but they also suffer through cannibalization of inflows. 
Ye (2005) shows that the increase in 12b-1 fees will increase fund inflows only 
when funds’ past performance is good. Since the scandal-tainted funds face more 
unfavorable marketing situations and more pressure from redemptions, the fund 
managers may exercise the discretion in changing the 12b-1 fee expenditure to 
                                                        
8 About two-thirds of all mutual funds shareholders own funds outside defined contribution retirement plans 
(ICI, 2005). 
9 Other sources include fund companies directly, fund supermarkets, and discount brokers. 
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provide brokers more incentives to influence fund investors although such 
discretion is subject to the upper bound of the 12b-1 fee rate. This concern leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
H1: 12b-1 fees play a role in helping scandal-tainted funds to recapture the 
investor redemptions and reduce asset outflows from families.  
 
  At the end of 2003, $3,934 billion dollars of mutual fund assets were held in 
individual accounts, and $3,481 billion assets were held in institutional accounts 
(ICI, 2004). Retail investor may paint all scandal funds with the same brush and 
withdraw from any fund in scandal-tainted families. Schwarz and Potter (2006) 
provide evidence that retail investors continue to exit scandal funds regardless of 
subsequent performance, whereas institutional investors focus on performance 
regardless of whether the fund was involved in a scandal. Since the strong 
performance may or may not persist, institutional investors also care more about 
the future performance of the scandal-tainted funds. The famous behavior of 
institutional investors is “voting with their feet” when institutional investors are 
dissatisfied with management of firms. Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003) provide the 
first empirical evidence that institutional investors sell shares in poorly managed 
firms prior to the turnover of CEOs. They also argue that some institutional 
investors, such as bank trust departments, tend to hold more prudent shares. Fund 
scandals show that there are some serious problems in fund management and thus 
make scandal-tainted funds less favorable for institutional investors. Moreover, 
Schwarz and Potter (2006) provide evidence that scandal-tainted funds 
significantly underperform their peers during “scandal periods” (from Mar. 2000 
to Aug. 2003). Institutional investors’ concerns about the likelihood of future poor 
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performance and higher performance volatility may drive them to sell those 
scandal-tainted funds. Since the ownership structure of each fund cannot be 
directly obtained, the distribution channel of each fund can proxy for the main 
ownership structure of this fund. This paper uses data from CRSP to classify retail 
vs. institutional funds. The above discussion leads to Hypothesis 2: 
H2: The scandal-tainted funds classified as institutional funds experience more 
outflows of assets than retail funds do. 
 
  Some Wall Street shots, such as Bank of America, Alliance Capital and 
Franklin Resources, are involved in the 2003 mutual fund scandals. These parent 
firms usually have good reputation and more resources potential to offset the 
negative impact of scandals on their affiliated fund families. In other words, the 
reputation of these large financial conglomerates and their strong asset 
background may, to some extent, provide potential “collateral” against default for 
their affiliated funds and mitigate investors’ concerns about the harm of future 
costs of indictment. Moreover, investors’ posterior expectation about the firm’s 
strong reputation leads investors’ beliefs to change only gradually as investors 
receive new signals (investors are like the consumers in the setting of Mailath and 
Samuelson (2001)). The above discussion leads to Hypothesis 3 based on 
reputation effects. 
H3: If a scandal-tainted fund is affiliated to a big financial conglomerate, it 
may experience less outflows of assets. 
 
Choi and Kahan(2006) show that the types of fund scandals affect the 
investment decisions. Qian (2006) find that the SEC charge record has a positive 
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relation with the fund flow volatility. It is very likely that funds with scandal 
history are more likely to be approached by arbitragers. The SEC charge history 
may be a proxy of funds’ reputation. Such records have implications on the 
market punishment by investors. Repeated wrong-doers are likely to be punished 
more. This discussion leads to Hypothesis 4. 
H4: If a scandal-tainted fund itself, its parent firm, or an employee has SEC 
charge records, it may experience more outflows than those with no record. 
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Chapter 4: Data and Methodology 
 
   I employ two approaches to test hypotheses: the regression analysis and 
event-study approach. To classify scandal-tainted funds, I obtain the list of fund 
families involving in investigations and settlements from Money Management 
Executive Compilation on Jan. 31, 2004 and from Appendix A1 of Qian (2006). 
The list is updated with the Wall Street Journal’s “Scandal Scorecard”, 
Morningstar’s Fund Investigation Update, and the SEC’s press releases. I define 
the “scandal-tainted funds” as funds that are operated by fund families involving 
in investigations and settlements. The specific month of the initial news date (the 
first date in which an investigation is mentioned in the press) is defined as the 
event month 0 (Houge and Wellman, 2005). The months prior to or after (or 
including) the event month are defined as the pre-scandal-initial-news period or 
post-scandal-initial-news period, respectively.  
 
For the regression approach, I focus on the monthly fund flows during event 
month -12 to 6. For the event-study approach, I replicate the short-term 
event-study method in Del Guercio and Tkac (2008). Specifically, I use 24 months 
of data (i.e., event month -26 to -3) to calculate the coefficients for the benchmark 
flow regressions. Then I use 6 months of data (i.e., event month 0 to 6) to find the 
abnormal flows.  
 
The data of funds’ TNAs, monthly raw returns, fund fees and expenses, 
distribution channels are obtained from CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual 
Fund Database. The data of the ownership structures of fund management 
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companies are collected from the firms’ websites. The SEC charge record data are 
collected from the SEC’s press releases. Appendix A summarizes the fund 
families involving in the trading scandals. 
 
4.1 Definition of variables 
 
4.1.1 Dependent variable 
  I define the net flow (FLOW) as the monthly net growth in fund assets beyond 












   ,                              (1) 
Where TNAi,t is fund i's total net assets or the dollar value of all shares 
outstanding at month t, and Ri,t is the fund’s return over the current month.  
 
4.1.2 Explanatory variables 
  Aligned with the four hypotheses, I choose the fund’s 12b-1 fee rate, 
classification as retail fund or institutional fund in CRSP, its management 
company’s ownership structure and the SEC charge record as explanatory 
variables. 
 
  The fund’s 12b-1 fee rate is not a good proxy for the fund’s 12b-1 expenditure 
since the fund manager has a lot of discretion in allocating this expenditure. The 
more reliable access is to investigate the N-SAR forms in SEC’s filings (Ye, 
2005). But this approach is also subject to the potential problem that the 12b-1 fee 
is just one source of brokers’ compensation for distributing and marketing 
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services, since brokers can be compensated from front-end loads or commissions. 
All in all, the 12b-1 fee is not an accurate proxy for fund’s expenditure on 
brokerage. But due to the lack of precise measurement of 12b-1 fees, I use the 
12b-1 fee rate as one explanatory variable and add the fund’s front loads, rear 
loads and expenses ratio to the control variables to mitigate the above concerns. 
 
  If the fund is classified as retail or institutional fund in CRSP, the dummy 
variables, Retail or Institutional, take on the value of 1 (0, otherwise). The third 
type of funds in CRSP is “fund of funds”.  
 
  For the ownership characteristics of fund’s management company, I follow 
Qian (2006) and classify the ownership structure of the fund’s management 
company into four categories: (1) a subsidiary of a commercial bank (SubBank), 
(2) a subsidiary of an assets management company (SubAMC), (3) a subsidiary of 
a financial services group (SubFSG), and (4) a subsidiary of a fund management 
company privately owned by partners or employees (Private). Some 
scandal-tainted funds’ management companies, such as Alliance Capital and 
Franklin Resources that are famous in the fund industry, are categorized as “a 
subsidiary of an assets management company”. So the groups of “a subsidiary of 
an assets management company” and “a subsidiary of a financial services group” 
can represent the funds affiliated to big financial conglomerates. The dummy 
variables, SubBank, SubAMC, SubFSG and Private, represent the above four 
categories, and act as the focus of interest in the test of Hypothesis 3. 
 
  The purpose of this paper is to investigate the different influences of some fund 
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characteristics on the fund flows during the scandal-event window. To capture the 
post-event effects, I incorporate the dummy variable, Post, which takes on the 
value of 1 to indicate the data of event months including and following the 
scandal-initial-news date, and interact it with the intercept and the above 
explanatory variables.  
 
  SEC charge record (Record) identifies whether these fund management 
companies, parent-companies, affiliated companies or employees were charged 
for fraud or violation by SEC during the past 8 years.  
 
4.1.3 Control variables 
Following the previous literature (e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Barber, Odean 
and Zheng , 2005; Qian, 2006), I incorporate some control variables into the 
regression models: 
(1) Fund’s style flow (Styleflow) denotes the monthly aggregate net flow to the 
fund style that this fund belongs to. This variable controls for the industry-level 
effect of the fund’s investment style on the individual fund’s net flows. The 
traditional fund style variables are ICDI’s Fund Objective Codes. However, these 
codes are not available in CRSP after Jun. 2003. I use Standard & Poor’s Style 
Codes in CRSP and classify all the sample funds into 8 groups: Growth, Balance, 
Global, Sector, Fixed income, Municipal, Money market, and Others. Then I 
calculate the aggregate monthly net flows into these 8 groups respectively.  
 
(2) Fund’s past cumulative returns for the previous 3 months (PastRett) is 
controlled for since Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), Evans (2006), and Qian (2006) 
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provide evidence that fund flows have a strong relation with the raw returns but 
are weakly or not related with the risk-adjusted performance measure-Jensen’s 
alpha. 
 
(3) The squared term of the fund’s past cumulative returns (SqrPastRett) controls 
for the potential convexity in the relation between flows and fund performance. 
 
(4) The log of the total net asset (LogTNAt-1) of the fund prior to the month of 
interest. This variable controls for the effect of fund size.  
 
(5) Front-end loads (Front), rear loads (Rear) and expenses ratio (Expenses) of the 
fund are controlled for since they are all related to fund flows, which is indicated 
by the existing literature. 
 
4.2 Basic Regression Model 
 
Following specifications in the previous literature (e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998; 
Barber, Odean and Zheng , 2005; Qian, 2006; Greene, Hodges and Rakowski, 
2007), I construct this model: 
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To avoid the multicollinearity problem, the SubBank (a subsidiary of a 
commercial bank) is chosen as benchmark and is excluded from the above model. 
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To test H1, I include 12b-1 fees and its interaction with the post-initial-news 
period dummy (post-event dummy), Post, in the basic regression model. To test 
H2, I include funds’ distribution channel dummies, Retail and Institutional, and 
their interaction terms with Post. To test H3, I include management companies’ 
ownership dummies and their interaction terms with Post. To test H4, I include 
the dummy of SEC charge records and its interaction term with Post. I run the 
OLS pooled regression to test these hypotheses and report t-statistics adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering in observations. 
 
  If the hypotheses hold, the coefficients on interaction terms will be significant, 
indicating that there exists some structural breaks in the model during different 
subperiods. As a result, the explanatory variables have different influences on the 
fund flows between pre-initial-news period and post-initial-news period.  
 
4.3 Event-Study Approach 
 
  To provide another approach to test the hypotheses, I replicate the short-term 
event-study method in Del Guercio and Tkac (2008) to calculate the abnormal 
flows of scandal-tainted funds.  
  ,i t j i t i tjFLOW Control , ,    
,
                                (3) 
  , , ˆ ˆi t i t j i tjAbFLOW FLOW Control                             (4) 
  Equation (3) is the benchmark flow regression. I define the estimation period 
for each sample fund as a 24-month period ending at the month prior to the 
scandal-initial-news month (e.g., event month -26 to -3). The estimation period 
ends at event month -3, which can purge off the effect of information leakage. 
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Equation (3) only includes control variables since the classical fund flow 
regression (as discussed in Literature Review Section) assumes that flows are 
related to past performance, fund fees and expenses, fund size and style-level 
flows (e.g., Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005); Qian (2006); Del Guercio and Tkac 
(2008)). Using the coefficients estimated from Equation (3), Equation (4) 
calculates the abnormal fund flows for the post-event periods (e.g., event month 0 
to 6). This abnormal flow captures fund-specific determinants of flow that are 
attributed to control variables, except for the effects of explanatory variables. 
Following the cross-sectional model described in Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 
(1997), I run a cross-sectional regression of the abnormal flows on the explanatory 
variables to test four hypotheses. 
  , , ,i t j i t i tj p p tAbFLOW Explanatory Controls ,                  (5) 
 
4.4 Sample Selection 
 
  For the regression approach, this study defines event window as 19-month 
periods (event month -12 to 6) starting from 12 months prior to the 
scandal-initial-news month and ending at the following seventh month (including 
the event month 0). This definition seems to be arbitrary, but this setting caters to 
short-run event-study approach since the main purpose of this study is to capture 
the most significant market reactions to the disclosure of fund scandals. In the 
robustness tests, I change the length of event windows to test whether the results 
are sensitive to the choice of event windows. 
 
  As Appendix A indicates, most scandal disclosure occurred after Sep. 1st, 2003 
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and concentrated on the following 6 months. Using Appendix A, I identify 4,028 
funds as scandal-tainted funds, including the funds in the fund families implicated. 
Although some of these funds were not involved in violation behavior, this 
classification allows us to take into account the “spillover” effect in mutual fund 
families. Since funds in the same families are highly correlated in management 
and face the same external circumstance, the negative effects of investigation can 
disseminate to all family funds and lead to massive redemptions. One type of the 
spillover effect from a star fund to other funds in the same family has been 
documented by Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004). 
 
The original sample covers the universal funds in CRSP from Jan. 2001 to Dec. 
2005. The data availability constraints for the dependent and independent 
variables are imposed on the original sample. The outliers with monthly flow rates 
exceeding 1 or -1 are excluded from the original sample. These outliers only 
represent 1% of the distribution of all the flow rates, respectively. The data of 
funds with monthly TNA less than 5 million dollars are deleted. 
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Chapter 5: Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
 
  Table 1 provides the year by year (from 2001 to 2005) summary statistics for 
the original sample. Panel B of Table 1 shows that the mean monthly fund flows 
of scandal-tainted funds in 2004 and 2005 are negative, while Panel C of Table 1 
shows that non-scandal-tainted funds in 2004 and 2005 experience positive fund 
flows. This pattern is also shown in Figure 1. Table 1 and Figure 1 indicate that 
scandal-tainted funds may experience significant money outflows after the scandal 
was exposed. 
 
Using the event month window (-24, 24), Figure 2 plots the mean flows of 
scandal-tainted funds in the three categories: ownership characteristics of fund 
management companies, retail vs. institutional funds, and funds with and without 
SEC charge records. Clear difference within each category is difficult to be 
identified in Figure 2.  
 
  Using the window of event month -12 to 6, I retrieve 68,057 fund-months from 
the original sample. This sample constitutes the basis sample for the pooled 
regression analysis. Table 2 compares the mean monthly flows of scandal-tainted 
funds in three categories. T-statistics testing the difference in mean are reported in 
the last column of Table 2. The results indicate that funds with different 
managerial characteristics experience significantly different flows during event 
month 0 to 6. Panel A shows that the flows of funds classified as subsidiaries of 
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financial services groups experience less money outflows than funds classified as 
subsidiaries of commercial banks. The difference in the mean values is 
statistically significant. However, the difference between funds classified as 
subsidiaries of assets management companies and the benchmark, funds classified 
as subsidiaries of commercial banks, is not significant. The difference between 
funds classified as privately owned and the benchmark is marginally significant at 
the 10% level. Panel B shows that the difference in mean flows is significant for 
retail vs. institutional funds. Panel C shows that the difference between funds with 
and without SEC charge records is statistically significant. Table 2 is supportive 
of H2, H3 and H4. 
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Table 1: Annual summary statistics for universal funds, scandal-tainted 
funds and non-scandal-tainted funds, 2001-2005 
 
This table provides yearly summary statistics of the universal funds, scandal-tainted funds and 
non-scandal-tainted funds from 2001 to 2005. The data include means and standard deviations 
of monthly fund flows, monthly TNA, monthly returns of funds, their 12b-fees, front-end 
loads, rear-end loads and expenses ratios. The means and standard deviations for pre-scandal 

















Panel A: Universal funds 
Mean 
2001 125,766 1.35 520.92 -0.38 0.34 1.13 0.94 1.23 
2002 137,860 0.95 489.55 -0.83 0.34 1.11 0.93 1.26 
2003 148,890  1.10 487.49 1.61 0.34 1.09 1.11 1.26 
2004 156,910 0.73 497.39  0.75 0.35 1.11 1.12 1.27 








154,269  0.66 513.93 0.64 0.35 1.11 1.13 1.26 
Standard deviation 
2001 - 9.48 2389.24 5.55 0.38 2.07 1.73 0.62 
2002 -  9.05 2203.11  4.77 0.39 2.04 1.71 0.64 
2003 -  9.19 2142.49  3.20 0.39 2.04 1.66 0.66 
2004 - 8.93 2263.19  2.64 0.39 2.06 1.63 0.65 








-  8.89 2301.17  2.60 0.39 2.06 1.60 0.64 
Panel B: Scandal-tainted funds 
Mean 
2001 29,738  1.67 536.49  -0.44 0.41 1.22 1.10 1.28 
2002 32,098  0.76 472.13  -0.81 0.43 1.20 1.10 1.33 
2003 34,849 0.48 445.07  1.50 0.43 1.21 1.33 1.34 
2004 36,377 -0.48 412.33  0.72 0.44 1.23 1.41 1.34 


















Table 1: Annual summary statistics for universal funds, scandal-tainted 









35,489 -0.48 406.39  0.61 0.44 1.24 1.51 1.33 
Standard deviation 
2001 - 9.38 1747.13 5.40 0.40 2.11 1.83 0.61 
2002 - 8.64 1597.32 4.61 0.40 2.10 1.82 0.63 
2003 - 8.57 1559.12 3.06 0.41 2.11 1.73 0.64 
2004 - 6.89 1422.64 2.54 0.41 2.12 1.74 0.64 








- 7.04 1420.42 2.47 0.41 2.12 1.72 0.63 
Panel C: Non-scandal-tainted funds 
Mean 
2001 96,028 1.47 559.35 -0.33 0.31 1.11 0.89 1.22 
2002 105,762 1.11 508.22 -0.83 0.32 1.07 0.88 1.24 
2003 114,041 1.30 500.45 1.65 0.32 1.05 1.05 1.24 
2004 120,533 0.72 550.26 0.76 0.32 1.07 1.11 1.25 








118,780 1.01 588.90 0.64 0.33 1.07 1.16 1.23 
Standard deviation 
2001 - 9.53 2667.37 5.55 0.38 2.05 1.70 0.63 
2002 - 9.11 2389.05 4.82 0.38 2.02 1.68 0.64 
2003 - 9.35 2291.16 3.25 0.38 2.02 1.63 0.66 
2004 - 8.71 2522.93 2.64 0.38 2.04 1.60 0.65 








- 7.97 1935.74 2.69 0.40 2.07 1.66 0.62 
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Table 2: Comparison of mean fund flows of scandal-tainted funds within 
different managerial characteristic groups for event month (0, 6) 
 
This table reports the time-series means of monthly flows for event month (0, 6). The number 
of observations is reported below the mean value in the parenthesis. Panel A reports the mean 
flow for different fund management company characteristics. The last column reports the 
t-stat of the test of the difference between the mean flows of the subsidiary of commercial 
banks and the flows of other fund management company characteristics. Panel B reports the 
mean flow for different distribution channels. The last column reports the t-stat of the test of 
the difference between the mean flows of the retail funds and institutional funds. Panel C 
reports the mean flow for different SEC charge records. The last column reports the t-stat of 
the test of the difference between the mean flows of the funds with SEC charge records vs. 
funds without SEC charge records. The P-value is reported below the t-stat in the last column.  
 Mean of monthly flows for Event month (0,6)  
(%) 
t-stat  
Panel A: Mean fund flows for fund management company characteristics  
































Panel C: Mean fund flows for fund with and without SEC charge records 
With SEC charge records 0.001 
(5,497) 
- 






Note: ***, ** and * indicate significant t-stat at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Figure 1: Mean flows for scandal-tainted funds vs. non-scandal tainted funds 
(Continued) 
 












Non-scandal-tainted funds Scandal-tainted funds
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Figure 2: Mean flows for hypotheses 
 





Figure 2: Mean flows for hypotheses (continued) 
 





































5.2 Pooled Regression Results 
 
  Table 3 shows the regression results of testing four hypotheses. Petersen 
(2009) indicates that the OLS standard errors underestimate the true standard 
errors when a fixed firm effect exists in both the independent variables and 
residuals. To account for a fixed fund effect, t-statistics adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering in observations are reported.  
 
Model 1 in the second column of Table 3 assumes that there does not exist 
structural breaks for the full sample period. Then a pooled regression is run for 
Model 1. Almost all the coefficients on explanatory variables are not significant, 
except for those on 12b-1 and SubFSG. Under this specification, 12b-1 fees have a 
negative effect on fund flows. For control variables, the coefficient on cumulative 
lagged 3-month returns is significant. This finding is consistent with previous 
literature (e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Barber, Odean and Zheng , 2005; Guercio 
and Tkac, 2008; Greene, Hodges and Rakowski, 2007), which shows that lagged 
monthly returns significantly affect funds’ current flows. The coefficient on the 
squared terms of cumulative lagged 3-month returns, measuring the convexity of 
sensitivity of flow to past performance, is insignificant. These findings related to 
flow sensitivity to past performance are in line with Qian (2006). She shows that 
most of the convexity coefficients in the flow-performance sensitivity regressions 
for individual scandal-tainted funds are not significant. In this study, the finding 
that the convexity coefficients are not significant for scandal-tainted funds is at 
odd with the previous findings (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997); Goetzmann 
and Peles (1997); Sirri and Tuffano (1998)) that disproportionate inflows herd to 
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top performing funds. I propose a plausible explanation that the high risk of 
scandal-tainted funds prevents investors from chasing strong performers. The 
coefficients on styleflow are significant for all models, showing a positive relation 
between individual fund’s flow and the flow for the fund style to which this 
individual fund belongs. The coefficient on the lagged 1-month total net assets is 
negatively significant, which is consistent with some previous literature (e.g., Sirri 
and Tufano, 1998). The coefficients on the fund front and rear loads are not 
significant, while the coefficient on the expenses ratio is negatively significant. 
The insignificant effect of fund loads is consistent with Sirri and Tufano (1998) 
and Choi and Kahan (2006). 
 
  Model 2 tests H1. This model includes 12b-1 fee rate and its interaction term 
with the dummy Post, but excludes the interaction terms related to testing H2 to 
H4. The purpose of including the interaction term of explanatory variables and the 
dummy Post is to show that the explanatory variables have different effects on 
funds flows between pre-event and post-event periods. The coefficients on 12b-1 
fees and the interaction term are not significant, showing that the 12b-1 fees have 
no influence on fund flows for the above two periods. This result may be 
attributed to two different explanations. One is induced by Ye (2005) that an 
increase of 12b-1 fees only increases the flows of funds with good past 
performance. Given that scandal-tainted funds usually experience significant 
underperformance during scandal periods and that scandals increase the investors’ 
concern about the future uncertainty, the more brokerage expenditure through 
12b-1 fees may help little to attract new inflows and retain the redemptions. The 
other explanation is due to the lack of an accurate measurement of the proxy for 
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12b-1 fees. CRSP only provides the maximum 12b-1 fee rates, which are usually 
invariant throughout several years. Since the fund management has a lot of 
discretion in allocating 12b-1 fee expenditure within the upper bound, the 
invariant maximum 12b-1 fee expenditure rate is a poor proxy for actual 12b-1 fee 
expenditure and thus has little explanatory power for fund flows. Investigating the 
expenditure data in N-SAR filings in SEC may provide more information to 
examine the effects of 12b-1 fee expenditure. 
 
  In Model 2, the coefficients on other explanatory variables and control variables 
are quite similar to those in Model 1.  
 
  Model 3 tests H2. Institutional funds are mainly distributed to institutional 
investors. Institutional investors are generally assumed to be better informed than 
retail investors. H2 examines whether institutional scandal-tainted funds exhibit 
different patterns of flows compared to the benchmark-“fund of funds”. The 
coefficients on both retail and institutional fund dummies are statistically 
insignificant. This result cannot support H2 and may be attributable to two 
explanations. The first is due to the finding of Schwarz and Potter (2006) that 
retail investors withdraw from scandal funds but institutional investors focus on 
good performers of scandal funds. This can be interpreted as that the institutional 
investors’ “voting with feet” behavior is offset by their rationality on performance. 
The second explanation is due to noise in CRSP data. If using Morningstar data 
and its classification that institutional funds are defined as those with minimum 
initial investment requirements of at least $100,000 or funds that designate 
themselves as institutional, the classification may be more accurate than CRSP 
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data and would provide more desirable results. However, using CRSP data in 
Model 6, I also find a marginal effect of institutional funds. 
 
  Model 4 tests H3. The coefficients on the two managerial characteristics 
(SubAMC and SubFSG) without interaction are significant, showing that these 
characteristics affect fund flows. The coefficients on SubAMC and SubFSG are 
negative, indicating that during pre-event periods, the funds with fund 
management companies classified as subsidiary of asset management companies, 
and funds with fund management companies classified as subsidiary of financial 
services groups experience lower inflows than the benchmark-funds with fund 
management companies classified as subsidiary of commercial banks. For 
example, the coefficients on SubAMC is -0.07, meaning that in pre-event periods, 
such funds experience 7% lower inflows than funds of SubBank. However, during 
post-event periods, this situation reverses. The coefficients on interaction terms, 
Post* SubAMC and Post* SubFSG, are both positive and significant. Moreover, 
the magnitude of coefficients on interaction terms is larger than the absolute value 
of coefficients on dummies without interaction terms, showing that during 
post-event periods, funds of SubAMC and funds of SubFSG enjoy higher inflows 
than funds of SubBank. For example, funds of SubAMC experience 10% higher 
money inflows than funds of SubBank. Such difference is economically 
meaningful. Given that the mean flows of funds of SubBank is -0.004% for event 
month 0 to 6, and that the mean monthly TNA of scandal-tainted fund in 2003 is 
$445 million, we can calculate that funds of SubAMC experience 1.78 million 
dollars of inflows, while funds of SubBank suffer 17.80 million dollars of money 
outflows. As a result, this difference in fund flows has significantly economic 
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meaning. In contrast, the coefficients on Private and its interaction term are not 
significant, showing that privately owned fund management companies has less 
attraction to investors than those management companies owned by big financial 
conglomerates. 
 
The results in Model 4 are consistent with H3 that funds affiliated to big 
financial conglomerates experience less assets outflows than funds with other 
ownership structures of management companies. This evidence may be 
attributable to the potential “collateral” provided by big financial conglomerates. 
This collateral against default mitigates investors concerns about the future 
uncertainty. 
 
Model 5 tests H4. The coefficients on the SEC charge record and its interaction 
term are not significant. This result is not supportive of H4 and may be explained 
that investors care more about the current crisis of scandal-tainted funds than their 
wrong-doing history. 
 
In Model 6, all explanatory variables are included and tested. The results are 
similar to previous 4 models. The coefficients on 12b-1 fees and its interaction 
term remain insignificant. The same results about managerial characteristics are 
also observed in Model 5. The coefficients on control variables remain similar 
across all 6 models. Such results show that the estimation and inference are not 
driven by the above different specifications of models. However, the coefficient 
on Post*Institutional in Model 6 is different from that in Model 4. This coefficient 
is marginal significant at 10% level and has negative sign. If this finding is not 
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driven by problems in specification, it may show that institutional funds 
experience lower fund inflows than retail funds and “fund of funds”, which is 
consistent with H2. Data with less noise and more accurate information about the 
classification of retail funds vs. institutional funds would provide more insights 
into this issue. 
 
If family-level data instead of fund-level data are used, what happens to the test 
of four hypotheses? I also run the regression of Equation (2), but modify the 
definitions of variables. If the mean of 12b-1 fees within each family is higher 
than the mean across all families, the dummy variable High12b-1 takes on the 
value of 1, otherwise it takes on 0. If the proportion of the number of retail funds, 
institutional funds, funds with SEC charge record within each family is higher 
than the mean proportion across all families, the dummy variable HighRetail, 
HighInstitutional, HighRecord take on the value of 1, otherwise they take on 0. 
The control variables include the mean returns, mean loads, mean expenses and 
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(6) 
 
  Table 4 reports the results of testing four hypotheses. None of the hypotheses 
is supported by the results in Table 4. These results show that the relations 
between fund flows and the explanatory variables are vague if family-level data 
are used.
Table 3: Pooled regression results 
 
 
This table reports the regression results based on the following regression: 
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This model is estimated for all scandal-tainted funds with monthly data in the event window (-12, 6).  
The independent variables include managerial characteristics of funds, such as ownership of fund management 
companies, distribution channels, SEC charge records, and the returns, loads, expenses, and fees of funds. 
Dependent: Flow Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.60*** 0.62*** 0.75*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.75*** 
 (4.56) (4.54) (4.75) (5.48) (5.41) (4.91) 
Post - -0.05 0.16 -0.20 0.19 0.19 
 - (-0.12) (1.17) (-0.90) (0.98) (0.98) 
12b-1 -9.48* -9.97 -9.37* -9.36* -9.34* -12.04 
 (-1.70) (-1.47) (-1.70) (-1.66) (-1.62) (-1.51) 
Post*12b-1 - 6.30 - - - 6.77 
 - (0.16) - - - (0.91) 
SubAMC -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07** -0.07** -0.07** 
 (-1.11) (-1.11) (-1.11) (-2.14) (-2.38) (-2.42) 
Post* SubAMC - - - 0.17** - 0.14*** 
 - - - (2.95) - (3.65) 
SubFSG -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.10** -0.10*** -0.10*** 




Table 3: Pooled regression results (Continued) 
 
 
Post* SubFSG - - - 0.15*** - 0.13** 
 - - - (2.76) - (2.39) 
Private 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.09 
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.68) (0.72) (0.72) 
Post*Private - - - -0.03 - -0.14 
 - - - (-0.34) - (-1.02) 
Retail 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 
 (0.54) (0.53) (1.11) (1.10) (1.09) (1.10) 
Post*Retail - - -0.22 - - -0.20 
 - - (-1.47) - - (-1.53) 
Institutional -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 (-0.14) (-0.14) (0.47) (0.68) (0.69) (0.68) 
Post*Institutional - - -0.12 - - -0.23* 
 - - (-1.39) - - (-1.64) 
Record -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
 (-1.52) (-1.54) (-153) (-1.52) (-1.03) (-1.03) 
Post*Record - - - - -0.01 -0.01 
 - - - - (-0.11) (-0.04) 
Cumulative lagged 
3-month Returns 0.48
*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.57** 0.57** 0.57** 















1.18 0.68 0.67 0.51 
 
0.52 0.52 
 (0.76) (0.42) (0.40) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) 
Styleflow 2.87*** 3.77*** 3.88*** 3.18** 3.18** 3.16** 
 (2.31) (3.32) (3.27) (2.32) (2.37) (2.38) 
LogTNAt-1 -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
 (-3.92) (-3.92) (-3.92) (-3.92) (-3.89) (-3.88) 
Front -1.29 -1.30 -1.28 -1.29 -1.31 -1.31 
 (-1.42) (-1.42) (-1.42) (-1.42) (-1.42) (-1.42) 
Rear 0.80 0.88 0.80 0.80 0.77 0.80 
 (1.14) (1.17) (1.13) (1.13) (1.10) (1.14) 
Expenses -12.93** -12.77** -12.94** -12.94** -13.27** -13.27** 
 (-2.19) (-2.20) (-2.22) (-2.22) (-2.27) (-2.27) 
No. of Obs 68,057 68,057 68,057 68,057 68,057 68,057 
Adj-R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Note: t-stat adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering of observations in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate significant 
coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Pooled regression results using family-level data 
 
 
This table reports the regression results based on the following regression: 
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4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 1 0 ,
1 1
1 2 1 * 1 2 1
* * P r
* P r *
R e
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
F L O W H ig h b P o s t H ig h b S u b A M C
P o s t S u b A M C S u b F S G P o s t S u b F S G iv a te
P o s t iv a te H ig h In s t i tu t io n a l P o s t H ig h In s ti tu t io n a l
H ig h ta il
   
   
  

     
   
  
  1 2 1 3
1 2 , ,
* R e R e
* R e j i t i tj
P o s t H ig h ta i l H ig h c o r d






This model is estimated for all scandal-tainted fund family. The dependent variable is the money flow of each sample  
fund family in the event window (-12, 6). If the mean of 12b-1 fees within each family is higher than the mean across  
all families, the dummy variable High12b-1 takes the value of 1, otherwise it take 0. If the proportion of the No. of  
retail funds, institutional funds, fund with SEC charge record within each family is higher than the mean proportion 
across all families, the dummy variable HighRetail, Highinstitutional, HighRecord take the value of 1, otherwise they 
takes 0. The control variables include the mean returns, mean loads, mean expenses within each family. 
Dependent: Family flow Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.022* 0.024* 0.024* 0.022** 0.023* 0.025* 
 (1.66) (1.80) (1.82) (1.95) (1.76) (1.66) 
Post - -0.010* -0.008 -0.013** -0.005* -0.005* 
 - (-1.89) (-1.18) (-2.45) (-1.79) (-1.79) 
High12b-1 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.07) (-0.21) (-0.12) (-0.19) (-0.10) (-0.10) 
Post* High12b-1 - 0.002 - - - 0.001 
 - (0.24) - - - (0.23) 






Table 4: Pooled regression results using family-level data (Continued) 
 
 (-0.35) (-0.28) (-0.28) (-1.14) (-0.28) (-0.95) 
Post* SubAMC - - - 0.013 - 0.011 
 - - - (1.55) - (1.01) 
SubFSG -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 
 (-1.19) (-1.20) (-1.20) (-1.11) (1.20) (-1.18) 
Post* SubFSG - - - 0.001 - 0.002 
 - - - (0.07) - (0.21) 
Private -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.009** -0.011*** 0.09 
 (-2.85) (-2.78) (-2.80) (1.98) (-2.86) (0.72) 
Post*Private - - - -0.003 - -0.006 
 - - - (0.58) - (-0.91) 
HighRetail -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007* -0.007* -0.007** -0.008** 
 (-2.06) (-2.10) (-1.75) (-1.94) (-2.09) (-1.98) 
Post* High Retail - - -0.000 - - 0.003 
 - - (-0.00) - - (0.38) 
HighInstitutional -0.005* -0.006* -0.005 -0.005 -0.006* -0.005 
 (-1.74) (-1.65) (-1.57) (-1.62) (-1.66) (-1.51) 
Post* HighInstitutional - - -0.001 - - -0.001 
 - - (-0.12) - - (-0.24) 
Cumulative lagged 
3-month Returns 0.044
*** 0.035 0.031 0.034 0.032 0.026 




-0.032*** -0.055 -0.034 -0.045 
 
-0.032 -0.029 
 (2.48) (0.97) (0.94) (0.65) (1.18) (0.81) 
Styleflow 1.107*** 1.133*** 1.134*** 1.133*** 1.150*** 1.145*** 
 (3.34) (3.39) (3.38) (3.41) (3.41) (3.39) 





Table 4: Pooled regression results using family-level data (Continued) 
 
LogTNAt-1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.81) (-0.74) (-0.74) (-0.76) (-0.77) (-0.79) 
HighRecord -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.17) (-0.13) (-0.13) (-0.17) (0.65) (0.49) 
Post* HighRecord - - - - -0.008 -0.007 
 - - - - (-1.11) (-0.80) 
Front -0.432 -0.365 -0.361 -0.332 -0.378 -0.371 
 (-0.78) (-0.67) (0.67) (-0.62) (-0.69) (0.68) 
Rear -0.742 -0.640 -0.638 -0.617 -0.668 -0.661 
 (-1.66) * (-1.35) (-1.32) (-1.33) (-1.45) (-1.42) 
Expenses -0.442 -0.404 -0.410 -0.395 -0.431 -0.410 
 (-1.07) (-0.98) (-0.98) (0.96) (-1.05) (-1.00) 
No. of Obs 972 972 972 972 972 972 
Adj-R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Note: t-stat adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering of observations in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate significant  
coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
5.3 Results of Event-Study Approach 
 
I replicate the two-stage event-study method in Del Guercio and Tkac (2008).  
The advantage of using this event-study approach is to isolate the flow response to 
the effects of explanatory variables from those effects of control variables. This 
method helps to construct a clean test of all hypotheses. Using the event window 
(-26, 6), the data of scandal-tainted funds with continuous data during event 
month -26 to -3 are retrieved from the original sample. Then I obtain 95,251 
monthly observations. Running Equation (3) and Equation (4) for the estimation 
period and event period respectively, 2,862 standardized abnormal flows are 
obtained. 
 
Table 5 reports the t-statistics and the average standardized abnormal flows 
over the event month 0 to 6. Under the setting of the classical event study on stock 
returns, market efficiency implies an immediate stock price reaction to new 
information. However, the fact that the impact of a fund scandal on fund flows 
may persist over the subsequent months should be taken into account in this study. 
An immediate flow reaction to the scandal is presumably due to vigilant investors 
who monitor funds on daily basis. But a delayed flow response is also plausible 
either because investors make investment decisions at longer intervals or because 
they care more about the consequence of implications. As a result, using monthly 
flow data rather than daily data may capture the clearer picture of investors’ 
reaction to the fund scandal. 
 
  I focus on the standardized abnormal flows standardized by the estimated 
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forecast variance of the abnormal flow. As a result, the abnormal flows with more 
precisely prediction are weighted more heavily in the calculation of the average 
abnormal flow across funds in each event month. In addition, I calculate the 
cumulative standardized abnormal flows from event month 0 to 6. To test the 
statistical significance of standardized abnormal flows and cumulative abnormal 
flows, the test of Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) is used. Table 5 shows 
that in most post-event months, the funds classified as subsidiaries of asset 
management companies and subsidiaries of privately owned asset management 
companies, retail and institutional funds, and funds with and without SEC charge 
records experience significantly negative asset inflows. Interestingly, the abnormal 
flows of funds as subsidiaries of financial services groups are mostly insignificant. 
The focus of this event-study approach is on the standardized abnormal flows 
during event months (0, 6). I also report the average abnormal flows and average 
cumulative abnormal flows during event month (7, 12) for the need of reference. 
The results are similar to those for event months (0, 6). The means of the average 
abnormal flows and average cumulative abnormal flows during event months (13, 
18) and (19, 24) are also reported in Table 5. For most characteristic groups of 
scandal-tainted funds, the drifts of abnormal flows (the magnitudes of abnormal 
flows) decrease or remain the same with the length of event windows. This 
phenomenon may be attributed to the decreasing effects of fund scandals on fund 
flows. However, there are many salient difficulties in the long-horizon event-study 
methods, such as the measurement problems (Kothari and Warner, 2008). My 
results based on the long-horizon event-study results cannot provide convincing 
supports for the decreasing effects of scandals on fund flows. Since the focus of 
this study is on the short-horizon event study results, the results for long-horizons 
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are only used as reference. 
 
Following the cross-sectional model in Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), 
these abnormal flows are regressed on the explanatory variables to test the 
hypotheses. Table 6 shows the cross-sectional regression results. Model 1 to 
Model 4 test H1 to H4, respectively. Model 5 test the 4 hypotheses simultaneously. 
The results show that the 12b-1 fees do not have influence on the abnormal flows 
during post-event periods, which is consistent with the results in Table 3. The 
coefficients on the two managerial characteristics (SubAMC and SubFSG) are 
positive and significant, showing that these characteristics would mitigate the 
outflows for scandal-tainted funds. The same results are also observed in Table 3. 
In contrast to the marginally significant coefficient on Post*Institutional in Table 
3, the coefficients on the institutional fund dummy and retail fund dummy are 
both significant in Table 6. The magnitude of the coefficient on the institutional 
dummy is larger than that of the coefficient on the retail dummy. This result is 
supportive of H2. The contradictory results of testing H2 in different model 







Table 5: Statistical tests of abnormal flows for scandal-tainted funds 
 
This table reports average standardized abnormal flow (ASTAFt) and average cumulative standardized  
abnormal flow (ASTAFt) for scandal-tainted funds in post-event periods. Replicating Del Guercio and  
Tkac (2008), I define standardized abnormal flow in month t as the actual money flow in month t minus 
the normal, or expected, flow standardized by the estimated forecast variance of the normal flow.  
Normal flow is based on a regression whereby a fund’s monthly flow is regressed on aggregate flows 
in month t to funds in its same style group, its cumulative lagged 3-month returns, its 12-b1 fees, its log 
of total net assets, front and rear fees, and expenses. The estimation period for computing the abnormal 
flow is months (-26, -3). The t-stat is calculated using the standardized cross-sectional test of Boehmer, 
Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991). Funds are groups into several categories according to their ownership: 
(1) a subsidiary of a commercial bank (SubBank), (2) a subsidiary of an assets management  
company(SubAMC), (3) a subsidiary of a financial service group(SubFSG), and (4) a fund  
management company privately owned by partners or employees (Private); their distribution channels: 
Retail and Institutional; and their historical records of SEC charges. 
 























 ASTAFt ASTAFt ASTAFt ASTAFt ASTAFt ASTAFt ASTAFt ASTAFt ASTAFt
0 -0.35 -1.79 -0.17 -0.01 -0.13 -0.60 -0.12 -1.09 0.02 
 (-2.24) (-1.66) (-1.44) (-0.06) (-2.13) (-1.97) (-1.55) (-2.43) (0.22) 
1 -0.43 -1.92 -0.31 -0.13 -0.09 -0.76 -0.13 -1.24 -0.03 
 (-2.31) (-1.77) (-1.61) (-0.59) (-0.34) (-2.26) (-0.71) (-2.74) (-0.18)
2 -1.31 -1.99 -0.62 -0.95 -2.10 -1.84 -0.83 -1.52 -1.21 
 (-7.64) (-1.85) (-3.99) (-3.65) (-13.03) (-5.64) (-5.88) (-3.32) (-1.70)
3 -0.86 -2.00 -0.49 -0.13 -1.24 -1.32 -0.43 -1.30 -6.40 
 (-5.49) (-1.85) (-4.90) (-0.96) (-12.94) (-4.20) (-5.12) (-2.87) (-9.53)
4 -0.74 -1.94 -0.32 -0.19 -1.07 -1.09 -0.42 -1.16 -0.53 
 (-4.47) (-1.80) (-2.85) (-1.02) (-11.30) (-3.45) (-4.21) (-2.54) (-7.27)
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Table 5: Statistical tests of abnormal flows for scandal-tainted funds (Continued) 
 
5 -0.61 -1.92 -0.35 -0.17 -0.60 -0.91 -0.32 -1.20 -0.31 
 (-3.77) (-1.78) (-3.09) (-1.02) (-4.40) (-2.85) (-3.13) (-2.64) (-3.67)
6 -0.74 -2.03 -0.67 -0.41 -0.71 -1.01 -0.50 -1.27 -0.49 
 (-4.48) (-1.88) (-3.99) (-1.67) (-4.97) (-3.15) (-3.90) (-2.67) (-6.04)
7 -0.50 -2.04 -0.46 0.98 -0.72 -0.93 -0.10 -1.00 -0.24 
 (-2.26) (-1.91) (-2.38) (1.27) (-6.13) (-2.93) (-0.32) (-1.90) (-1.24)
8 -0.68 -2.16 -0.44 -0.23 -0.57 -0.90 -0.48 -1.37 -0.34 
 (-3.43) (-1.97) (-1.45) (-1.25) (-3.64) (-2.74) (-2.04) (-2.95) (-1.81)
9 -0.81 -2.34 -0.79 -0.03 -0.60 -1.07 -0.57 -1.41 -0.52 
 (-4.60) (-2.17) (-3.88) (-0.15) (-4.68) (-3.29) (-3.54) (-3.01) (-4.05)
10 -0.71 -2.33 -0.71 -0.62 -0.03 -0.87 -0.55 -1.54 -0.30 
 (-3.40) (-2.10) (-3.37) (-2.99) (-0.06) (-2.44) (-2.37) (-3.22) (-1.48)
11 -0.83 -2.30 -0.76 -0.34 -0.55 -1.08 -0.60 -1.48 -0.52 
 (-4.84) (-2.05) (-5.04) (-1.76) (-3.94) (-3.19) (-5.22) (-3.02) (-5.50)
12 -0.85 -2.42 -0.77 0.00 -0.73 -1.25 -0.47 -1.34 -0.61 








-0.71 -1.58 -0.34 -0.09 -1.03 -0.87 -0.65 -1.14 -0.30 
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Table 5: Statistical tests of abnormal flows for scandal-tainted funds (Continued) 
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-0.01 -0.13 -0.60 
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0.87) -1.77) (-6.66) (-3.38) (-4.40) 






-0.74 -2.57 -0.92 
 
 





-0.86 -0.61 -2.07 -2.51 
(-9.70) (-2.31) 
-0.85 -2.81 -1.06 
 
 





-0.93 -0.62 -2.13 -3.57 
(-9.53) (-3.46) 
-0.91 -3.06 -1.09 
 
 







-2.24 -2.83 -1.03 -3.31 -1.19 
 
 





-1.33 -0.35 -2.32 -2.98 
(-9.18) (-3.37) 
-1.15 -3.46 -1.31 
 
 





-1.41 -0.40 -2.38 -3.11 
(-8.75) (-3.31) 
-1.24 -3.71 -1.35 
 
 





-1.58 -0.39 -2.44 -3.27 
(-8.45) (-3.12) 
-1.35 -3.96 -1.44 
 
1  





-1.71 -0.54 -2.34 -3.38 
(-7.07) (-3.25) 
-1.40 -4.22 -1.46 
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1  2 -0.78 -7.50 -1.99 -0.59 -2.49 -3.73 -1.61 -4.63 -1.64 
 
M  



















-0.26 -9.04 -2.57 -1.03 -3.17 -4.06 -2.11 -4.83 -1.71 
Note: test-statistics that are significant at the 5% significant level or better are reported in bold in the parentheses 
Table 6: Regression results of abnormal flows on the explanatory variables 
 
 
Normal flow is based on a regression whereby a fund’s monthly flow is regressed on 
aggregate flows in month t to funds in its same style group, its cumulative lagged 3-month 
returns, its 12-b1 fees, its log of total net assets, front and rear fees, and expenses. The 
estimation period for computing the abnormal flow is event month (-26, -3). The results of 
this table are estimated from the following models: 
, , ,i t j i t i tj p p t
AbFLOW Explanatory Controls ,        
 
Dependent: AbFlow Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept -3.40 -1.29*** 3.18 2.23 -4.31 
 (-3.21) (-2.52) (1.63) (1.54) (-1.69) 
12b-1 -13.20 - - - -4.06 
 (-1.35) - - - (3.36) 
SubAMC - 1.23*** - - 1.06** 
 - (2.32) - - (2.31) 
SubFSG - 1.21*** - - 1.11** 
 - (2.24) - - (2.19) 
Private   - 1.03 - - 0.92 
 - (0.93) - - (1.27) 
Retail - - -4.84*** - -2.92*** 
 - - (-2.83) - (-2.97) 
Institutional - - -5.87** - -5.77** 
 - - (-2.32) - (-2.41) 
Record - - - -5.19 -3.65 
 - - - (-1.53) (-1.42) 
Cumulative lagged 
3-month returns 2.01
*** 1.91*** 1.94*** 1.75*** 2.04*** 




-1.91 1.81 -2.75 -1.88 -1.06 
 (-0.14) (0.13) (-0.02) (-0.16) (-0.20) 
LogTNA 0.15* 0.03 0.04 0.11* 0.14 
 (1.81) (0.67) (0.88) (1.92) (0.93) 
Front -1.45*** -1.37*** -1.40*** -1.43*** -1.97*** 
 (-2.29) (-2.21) (-2.12) (-2.23) (-2.24) 
Rear -1.44 1.29 -2.78* -1.57 1.98 
 (-0.42) (0.74) (-1.78) (-0.91) (1.19) 
Expenses -2.14 -2.03 -2.50 -2.32 -2.78 
 (-0.85) (-0.97) (-0.31) (-0.89) (-1.19) 
No. of Obs 19,889 19,889 19,889 19,889 19,889 
Adj-R-squared 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Note: t-stat adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering of observations in the parenthesis. 
***, ** and * indicate significant coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Chapter 6: Robustness Tests 
 
6.1 Alternative Model Specification 
 
The results presented above may be driven by different model specifications. 
For finance panel datasets, the fixed effects or random effects model is commonly 
used to estimate standard errors in panel datasets. I fit a random effects panel 
regression instead of a fixed effects model to Equation (2). The reason of choosing 
a random effects model is that the fixed effects model cannot be estimated due to 
the existence of some dummy variables. The dummy variables representing the 
ownership, distribution channel and SEC charge records are time-invariant for all 
the observations of a specific fund, like the fixed effects. So I choose the random 
effects model using FGLS to estimate standard errors. According to Petersen 
(2009), the standard errors produced by GLS are unbiased when the firm effect is 
permanent. This explanation shed some light in using random effects model. 
 
I run a random effects panel regression to test all the four hypotheses. Table 7 
reports the coefficients and test-statistics. The coefficients on the explanatory 
variables and control variables are similar to those in Model 6 of Table 3. Table 7 
supports H3. The results of testing H1, H2 and H4 are not significant. 
 
6.2. Alternative Event Window Periods 
 
To make sure that the empirical results are not driven by the different choices of 
the length of event windows, I employ different lengths of event windows: (-24, 
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11), (-12, 11), (-24, 5), (-24, 12), and find that the pooled regression results remain 
similar to those in Table 3 and Table 7. For the event-study approach, the choice 
of estimation periods may affect the abnormal flows. I use alternative event month 
-12 to -1 as the estimation periods. The results are similar to those in Table 5 and 
Table 6. These results are supportive of H2 and H3. 
 
6.3. Alternative Interpretation 
 
  The above empirical results have shown that the different ownership structures 
of fund management companies have different effects on fund flows in the 
post-event period. However, these results may be interpreted as a common status 
for both scandal-tainted funds and non-scandal-tainted funds. The different effects 
of ownership structures of fund management companies and distribution channels 
may not be unique for scandal-tainted funds. This section examines the possibility 
that the above empirical results are driven by the common effects for the universal 
mutual funds during the event periods. 
 
  Using the same data selection process for scandal-tainted funds, I retrieve 
168,076 monthly obervations from the universal funds sample. This dataset of 
non-scandal-tainted funds consists of 768 fund management companies or fund 
advisors which were not involved in the 2003 scandal. Sep. 2003 is chosen as the 
event month 0 for non-scandal-tainted funds, since the behavior of universal fund 
investors can be affected by the shock of the fund scandal exposed on Sep. 2003. 
Table 8 reports the cross-sectional regression results for non-scandal-tainted funds 
during event month (-12, 6). The results of non-scandal-tainted funds are different 
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from those of scandal-tainted funds. The 12b-1 fees have no effect on fund flows 
for the whole event period. For the funds classified as subsidiaries of asset 
management companies or financial services groups, such ownership structures of 
fund management companies have positive effects on fund flows during event 
month (-12, -11), however, such effects are not statistically significant during 
event month (0, 6). Interestingly, the results also show that retail funds and funds 
with SEC charge records experience significant fund outflows during event month 
(0, 6). Using the dataset of event month (-12, 12), the results are similar to those 
of Table 8. 
 
  The results observed for scandal-tainted funds are not replicated for the 
non-scandal-tainted funds’ sample. This difference indicates that the empirical 
results about scandal-tainted funds cannot be attributed to the common effects 
across universal funds. The comparison results of this section add to the 
understanding of the previous sections. 
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Table 7: Random effects regression results 
 
This table reports the random effects regression results based on the following model: 
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This model is estimated for all scandal-tainted funds with monthly data in the event window 
(-12, 6). The dependent variable is the monthly fund flow rates. The explanatory variables 
include the dummy, Post, indicating post-initial-news periods, the 12b-1 fee, the ownership 
characteristics of fund management companies, the fund distribution channel characteristics 
(retail funds vs. institutional funds), and the interaction terms of the dummy with the above 
characteristics. The control variables include past-three-month cumulative fund returns, fund 
flows in the same styles, fund loads, fees and expenses, fund sizes. 

































Cumulative lagged 3-month Returns 0. 57** 
 (2.39) 
Squared Cumulative lagged 3-month 















No. of Obs 53,255 
Adj-R-squared 0.06 
Note: z-stat adjusted for clustering in observations is reported in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * 
indicate significant coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Pooled regression results for non-scandal-tainted funds 
 
This table reports the pooled regression results based on the following model: 
, 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 , 7
8 , 9 , 1 0 ,
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This model is estimated for non-scandal-tainted funds. Sep., 2003 is chosen as the event 
month 0, and the dataset covers the event period of event month (-12, 6) for all 
non-scandal-tainted funds. The dependent variable is the monthly fund flow rates. The 
explanatory variables include the dummy, Post, indicating post-initial-news periods, the 12b-1 
fee, the ownership characteristics of fund management companies, the fund distribution 
channel characteristics (retail funds vs. institutional funds), and the interaction terms of the 
dummy with the above characteristics. The control variables include past-three-month 
cumulative fund returns, fund flows in the same styles, fund loads, fees and expenses, fund 
sizes. 

































Cumulative lagged 3-month Returns 0. 50** 
 (5.84) 
Squared Cumulative lagged 3-month 
















No. of Obs 168,076 
Adj-R-squared 0.06 
Note: Robust t-stat adjusted for clustering in observations is reported in the parenthesis. ***, ** 
and * indicate significant coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
  This paper examines the fund flows patterns of scandal-tainted funds during the 
2003 mutual fund scandal. The results identify some structural breaks in the 
scandal-tainted fund flow patterns. If an individual fund is affiliated to a big 
financial conglomerate, it would experience lower outflows of assets and attract 
more inflows than those funds with management companies privately owned. The 
12b-1 fees, proxy for marketing expenditure of mutual funds, have no significant 
effects on flows during the full sample periods. Retail funds or institutional funds, 
proxy for the funds’ distribution channels, have marginally significant effects on 
fund flows. The institutional funds experience more decline in inflows than retail 
funds. But this finding related to institutional funds is sensitive to choice of 
sample periods. The SEC charge records have no effect on fund flows. 
 
  This research is a preliminary study on the relations between mutual fund 
managerial factors and fund flows for scandal funds. The weakness and 
shortcoming in this study indicate several directions for future more in-depth 
study on this issue: First, using more accurate data from SEC filings (e.g,, specific 
12b-1 expenditure for individual funds) and Morningstar (e.g., more accurate 
classification of fund distribution channels) will add to the understanding of such 
relations. Second, using daily data may reveal the immediate reactions of vigilant 
investors. Third, the sample in this study includes all the funds in the same family 
as the indicted funds. The purpose of such sample selection is to incorporate the 
spillover effects into the analysis. Only focusing on the individual indicted funds 
may provide other interesting inferences.  
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Appendix A: The name list of fund families whose funds are involved in the 
2003 fund scandal 
 





Alliance Berstein Market timing 9/30/2003 Alliance Capital 
Nations Fund Market timing + 
Late trading 
9/3/2003 Bank of America 
One Group funds Market timing 9/3/2003 Banc One 
Columbia Funds Trading Practice 1/15/2004 FleetBoston  
Financial 
Federated Market timing + 
Late trading 
10/22/2003 Federated Investors
Flanklin Templeton Market timing 9/30/2003 Flanklin Resources 
Fred Alger Late trading 10/3/2003 Private 
Fremont Market timing 11/24/2003 Private 
Heartland Advisor Trading Practice+ 
Pricing violation 
12/11/2003 Private 
Invesco/AIM Market timing 12/2/2003 Amvescap PLC 
Janus Funds Market timing 9/3/2003 Janus Capital 
Loomis Sayles & Co Market timing 11/13/2003 CDC Assets  
Managements 
MFS Market timing 12/9/2003 Sun Life Financial 
PBHG Funds Market timing 11/13/2003 Old mutual PLC 
Pimco/PEA Capital Market timing 1/13/2004 Allianz group 
Putnam Investment Market timing 9/19/2003 Marsh&McLennan 
Scudder Investment Market timing 1/23/2004 Deutache Bank AG
Strong Capital Market timing 9/3/2003 Private 
RS Investment Market timing 3/3/2004 Private 
Excelsior Market timing + 
Late trading 
11/14/2003 Charles Schwab 
ING Investment Market timing + 
Late trading 
3/11/2004 ING group 
Evergreen Market timing 8/4/2004 Wachovia 
Seligman Trading Practice+ 
Market timing 
1/7/2004 private 
American Funds Market timing 12/29/2003 Capital Group 




Sources: Money Management Executive Compilation, January 31, 2004, 
Wall Street Journal, “Fund Scandal Scorecard” April , 27th 2004, 
The SEC press releases from September 2003 to December 2004. 
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